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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
When individuals are aﬀected by political decisions, they have an incentive to
try to inﬂuence the political outcome. One way of doing so is to participate in
lobby groups, which exercise pressure on the incumbent governments. For ex-
ample, ’green’ lobby groups may exercise political pressure to increase pollution
taxes, while industry lobby groups may try to reduce costs that are associated
with pollution. The number of lobby groups and the extent to which they af-
fect the political outcome may diﬀer both between countries and over time.1
Earlier literature on green lobbying and environmental policy has mainly fo-
cused on policies decided upon at the national level. Therefore, this paper
analyzes consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies
with transboundary environmental problems and international environmental
policies are analyzed.
Previous studies suggest that green lobbying leads to a stricter environmen-
tal policy at the national level. For example, Fredriksson (1997) and Aidt (1998)
show that more green lobbying may lead to higher pollution taxes in small open
economies with local pollution.2 Furthermore, Conconi (2003) introduces in-
teractions between countries, such as trade and transboundary pollution, and
examines how green lobbying aﬀects policy outcomes. She shows that the im-
pact of green lobbying depends crucially on the trade regime and on how lobby
groups act together. A speciﬁc result is that one country’s increase in pollution
taxes, triggered by lobbying, improves the terms of trade in favor of the other
country, which leads to an increase in that country’s production and emissions.
However, it is worth noting that Conconi (2003) does not consider consequences
of environmental policies that are determined in a negotiation between coun-
tries, which will be the case in this paper. Moreover, Aidt (2005) ﬁnds that
an increase in the inﬂuence from environmental lobby-groups may lead to lower
pollution taxes. This result rests on the assumption that pollution is immo-
bile and environmentalists care suﬃciently about pollution that arises abroad.
Speciﬁcally, when environmentalists are very concerned with pollution abroad,
the lobby group is willing to accept more domestic pollution in return for less
1See e.g. Conconi (2003) for a discussion on the importance of lobbying in real world
politics.
2Fredriksson (1997) uses a lobby group model to study how a pollution tax is aﬀected by
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pollution abroad. Accordingly, these two studies show that the standard in-
tuition, where stronger environmental lobby groups improve the environmental
quality, may not necessarily be correct.
In this paper, the standard lobby group model in Fredriksson (1997) is ex-
tended to include a negotiation between countries with respect to environmental
policy, here deﬁned as pollution taxes.3 Hence, the present paper does not fo-
cus on trade policies but instead on international environmental agreements.
The present paper considers a global economy consisting of many small coun-
tries but, to simplify the analysis as much as possible, it is assumed that only
two of them generate, and are aﬀected by, transboundary pollution. These
two countries coordinate their environmental policies (taxes) via a cooperative
Nash bargain, while treating the world market prices as exogenous. Although
the focus on a two-country agreement is a simpliﬁcation and motivated by con-
venience, the model is interpretable in terms of the literature on ’bottom-up’
agreements; see e.g. Buchner and Carraro (2005).4
The purpose of this paper is to bring together lobbying, transboundary en-
vironmental problems and international environmental policy. It follows earlier
literature on lobbying and employs a standard menu auction model ﬁrst applied
in Grossman and Helpman (1994).5 The menu auction model is a suitable tool
for analyzing situations where diﬀerent lobby groups oﬀer an incumbent gov-
ernment a menu of campaign contributions in return for a particular choice of
policy. It should perhaps be emphasized that lobby activities are assumed to
3It can perhaps be argued that a negotiation over national policy instruments directly is
an unrealistic assumption. However, this can - for example - be seen in economic federations
such as the European Union. In such federations carbon dioxide targets are determined at
the federal level although each member country choses how to implement the targets. As
for the present paper, the negotiation over national pollution taxes becomes equivalent to a
negotiation over national target levels.
4With a bottom-up approach, each country has the freedom to sign agreements with other
countries, bilaterally or multilaterally, without being constrained by a ’global’ convention (by
’global’ it is referred to e.g. the Kyoto protocol and other international agreements). The
bottom-up approach most likely lead to more regional coalitions with stronger incentives to
participate (see Buchner and Carraro (2005) for a more rigorous discussion of this topic).
If some countries do not take part in the agreement but are aﬀected by the transboundary
pollution, the approach does not completely internalize the external eﬀects. However, an
assumption of all countries taking part in the agreement is not suﬃcient to guarantee a
complete internalization.
5The model in Grossman and Helpman (1994) originates from a paper by Bernheim and
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be strictly national, meaning that campaign contributions are oﬀered to the do-
mestic government6, and depend on domestic government policies7. Hence, the
possibility of ‘cross-national’ lobbying is disregarded in this paper. Furthermore,
each government is assumed to care only about the probability of re-election,
which depends on a weighted sum of aggregate campaign contributions and
domestic social welfare.
The negotiation between the countries is characterized as a Nash bargain
with two possible outcomes facing each government. The preferred outcome to
both governments is a signed contract that, by deﬁnition, renders a higher level
of welfare than the no-contract outcome. If no contract is signed, each govern-
ment obtains the ‘fall-back’ welfare level, which represents a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium, where each government treats the policy instruments of the
other country as exogenous. Since each country beneﬁts from signing a contract,
the Nash bargain approach may be interpreted in terms of a ‘self-enforcing’
agreement.8 Moreover, it is also worth noting that, if the political process is
considered as a repeated game, the bottom-up approach may increase the cred-
ibility of the contract because a country could face a punishment in the next
round of negotiations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and its
characteristics. Section 3 deﬁnes and explains the political process. The main
results are presented in section 4, while section 5 summarizes and discusses the
results.
2 The Model
Consider a global economy consisting of many small countries. Two of these
countries, denoted by superindices 1 and 2, respectively, are identical in all
important respects. Pollution in each of these two countries is assumed to aﬀect
6There are studies where lobby groups in one country may oﬀer contributions to the gov-
ernment in the other country; see e.g. Prat and Rustichini (2003) for the multiple agent -
multiple principle approach. This approach is adopted by Fredriksson and Millimet (2007)
who study pollution taxation, and by Aidt and Hwang (2008) who study internalization of
’cross national’ externalities via labour standards.
7Grossman and Helpman (1995) extend their previous paper to allow for contribution
schedules that are contingent on tax policies in both countries.
8There is an existing body of literature that deals with game theoretic aspects of policy
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not only the domestic residents, but also residents in the other country. Notice,
however, that pollution is assumed to be transboundary only in a restricted
way, as no other country is aﬀected by the environmental damage generated by
these two particular countries.9
Production in country i, i =1 ,2, takes place in two sectors; one produces a
non-polluting good, ci, that serves as a numeraire, while the other produces a
polluting good, xi. Both countries produce both types of goods. The numeraire
good is produced with a linear technology that uses labor as the only input,
whereas good xi is produced with a constant returns to scale technology that
uses labor and a sector-speciﬁc input in the production. The sector-speciﬁc
input is assumed to be immobile and non-tradable. Furthermore, all markets
are assumed to be competitive and the wage rate is normalized to one in both
countries.
The government in country i has the possibility to levy a tax on the pollu-
tion associated with the production of good xi. Free trade and the assumption
of small open economies deﬁne the producer price of good xi as pi = p∗ − ti,
where p∗ is the world market consumer price on good xi and ti the corre-
sponding pollution tax paid by the producers. The assumption of price taking
economies implies that p∗ is exogenous to each country/government. The rev-
enue from the pollution tax in country i is given by τi = tixi and is redistributed
uniformly to all individuals.10 Proﬁt maximization deﬁnes a proﬁtf u n c t i o n ,
Πi(pi), and a supply function11, xi





pi¢2 =0 . Hotelling’s lemma deﬁnes the supply of good xi as
xi
s(pi)=∂Πi/∂pi (1)
Each country consists of Ni citizens who receive labor income, li, and, for
notational convenience, Ni is normalized to one. Some citizens are assumed to
have a special interest in the environmental quality, while others receive proﬁt
9It is, of course, possible to generalize the model to include more than two countries that
are aﬀected by environmental damage. However, given the objective of this paper it would
complicate the analysis without providing any valuable insights (at least in the symmetric
equilibrium, which is the main focus of the paper).
10The assumption of uniformly distributed revenues follows related literature, see e.g. Gross-
man and Helpman (1994) and Fredriksson (1997).
11A linear supply function is used for computational reasons and follows Fredriksson (1997).
An example of a production technology that implies a linear supply function is a Cobb-Douglas
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income from the production of xi. The remaining agents (i.e. those who are
neither environmentalists nor owners of the ﬁrm that produces xi) are called
workers. In what follows, these groups are denoted environmentalists, industri-
alists and workers, respectively (superindex E, I and W). By assumption, all
citizens share a common quasilinear utility function for ci and xi,w h e r e a se n v i -
ronmentalists also derive disutility from pollution associated with the produc-
tion of good xi.12 Hence, workers and industrialists have their utility functions
deﬁned as
UW,i = cW,i + u(xW,i) (2)
UI,i = cI,i + u(xI,i) (3)
while an environmentalist’s utility becomes
UE,i = cE,i + u(xE,i) − X (4)
where X is the disutility experienced from both domestic and foreign pollution,
deﬁned as X = xi + xj for i 6= j.N o t i c et h a txk,i, k = E,I,W, is the fraction
of xi associated with each group of individuals and that the marginal disutility
of pollution is normalized to one. It is assumed that all citizens receive income
from both labor and redistributed tax revenues, while industrialists also receive
proﬁt income from the polluting sector.
Citizens with interests in the polluting sector are assumed to organize them-
selves into lobby groups. Environmentalists join the environmental lobby group
and industrialists join the industry lobby group, while workers do not take part
in any lobbying. Lobby group membership is exogenous in the model, meaning
that all environmentalists and all industrialists are assumed to be members in
their respective groups.13
Citizens use their income to ﬁnance the consumption of ci and xi.H o w e v e r ,
environmentalists and industrialists also support their interests by campaign
contributions to the incumbent government. Campaign contributions in each
country are assumed to depend only on the domestic pollution tax rate, i.e.
ΛE,i(ti) and ΛI,i(ti). Other characteristics of the contribution schedules are
12The quasilinear utility function is appealing because it implies a simple demand structure
and there are no income eﬀects to be considered. A quasilinear utility function is also in line
with related literature as e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994).
13For a more general discussion of incentives associated with lobbying, see e.g. Olson (1965).6 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
discussed in more detail later in the paper. It is assumed that the environ-
mentalists recognize that a higher tax on pollution reduces production in the
polluting sector, while industrialists recognize that a higher tax on pollution
reduces proﬁts. Given these characteristics, each citizen chooses ci and xi to
maximize his/her utility subject to the budget constraint. The optimization
problem facing environmentalists and industrialists can be written as
max




s.t. li + τi = cE,i + p∗xE,i + ΛE,i/αE,i
and
max
cI,i,xI,iUI,i = cI,i + ui(xI,i) (6)
s.t. li + τi + Πi/αI,i = cI,i + p∗xI,i + ΛI,i/αI,i,
respectively, where αE,i and αI,i are the fractions of environmentalists and
industrialists, respectively, in country i. As described above, workers are not
lobby group members and do not give any campaign contributions. Hence, the
optimization problem facing each worker is written as
max
cW,i,xW,i UW,i = cW,i + ui(xW,i) (7)
s.t. li + τi = ci + p∗xW,i
By deﬁning Y k,i as each individual’s net income after redistributed tax rev-
enues (τi), proﬁts (Πi) and expenses for lobbying (Λk,i), the indirect utility
functions for each type of individual can be written as
V E,i(p∗,t i,YE,i)=Y E,i + u(x
E,i
d (p∗)) − p∗x
E,i
d (p∗) − X
V I,i(p∗,t i,YI,i)=Y I,i + u(x
I,i
d (p∗)) − p∗x
I,i
d (p∗) (8)
V W,i(p∗,t i,YW,i)=Y W,i + u(x
W,i
d (p∗)) − p∗x
W,i
d (p∗)
where the demand for the polluting good, associated with each type of in-
dividual, x
k,i
d (p∗),i st h ei n v e r s eo f∂u(xk,i)/∂xk,i = p∗ and the diﬀerence
u(x
k,i
d (p∗)) − p∗x
k,i
d (p∗) is the consumer surplus derived from the two goods.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 7
Each lobby group’s utility is deﬁned as the sum of its members’ utilities.
Hence, when omitting constant terms and in the absence of campaign contri-









By adding all indirect utilities, the aggregate social welfare function in country
i is deﬁned as




3T h e P o l i t i c a l G a m e
As mentioned in the introduction, the political process to determine the level of
pollution taxes can be described as a two stage game. The ﬁrst takes place at the
national level between the government and the lobby groups, where each lobby
group oﬀers the incumbent government a contribution schedule that depends
on the pollution tax rate, i.e. Λk,i(ti), k = E,I. The contribution schedule
from each lobby group is assumed to be continuously diﬀerentiable and each
lobby group treats the other lobby group’s contribution schedule as exogenous.
Following earlier literature (e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994)), possible ef-
fects of direct political competition (political parties) and lobby groups that do
not recognize that their contributions aﬀect the likelihood of re-election of the
incumbent government are disregarded.
In line with earlier comparable literature, it is assumed that the incumbent
government uses contributions to ﬁnance campaign spending. The incumbent
government realizes the relationship between campaign spending and the prob-
ability of re-election, and that the probability of re-election also depends on
the aggregate welfare of society. Therefore, given that re-election is the single
goal of the government, the incumbent government in each country maximizes a
weighted sum of aggregate campaign contributions and aggregate social welfare.





iΩi(ti,t j) (11)8 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
where λ
i ≥ 0 is an exogenous weight attached to aggregate social welfare relative
to campaign contributions.14
In the second stage, where the bargain between the two governments takes
place, each government takes the contribution schedules into consideration and
negotiates with the other country’s government about the policy. Let Wi =
Wi(ti,t j) be the welfare each government obtains if it signs a contract, and
W
i
the welfare obtained if no contract is signed (denoted ‘fall-back’). The fall-
back outcome is derived by assuming that each government behaves as a Nash
competitor by choosing its policy conditional on the other country’s policy, i.e.
the outcome will be a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. By deﬁning Ψi =
Wi−W
i
and Ψj = Wj −W
j
to be the rents from bargaining, the Nash bargain
maximizes the product
Γ = ΨiΨj (12)
with respect to ti and tj (where both governments are assumed to have equal







∂ti Ψi =0 (13)
3.1 The equilibrium
It is assumed that the environmental policy and the campaign contributions
are determined as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game presented
above. The characteristics of this subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that
each contribution schedule is feasible, that the chosen pollution taxes maximize
the government’s objective function and, given the contribution schedules of
each lobby group, no other lobby group has an alternative strategy that yields
ag r e a t e rp a y o ﬀ than the equilibrium payoﬀ. These characteristics follow the
equilibrium properties derived in Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit (1996)
and Fredriksson (1997), which are all based on the characterization of a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in a menu auction model developed in Bernheim and
14Following the model as deﬁned above, the government’s problem should be introduced as a










. However, this is equivalent







, given that the government values
a dollar in their campaign budget higher than a dollar in the hands of the public, i.e. given
that νi
1 >ν i
2. This assumption is in line with related literature and must hold when lobbying
exists.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 9
Whinston (1986). These equilibrium properties imply, among other things, that
∂Λk,i(ti)/∂ti = ∂Ωk,i(ti,t j)/∂ti for k = E,I (14)
The intuition behind this property is that each lobby group sets its contribution
schedule so that the change in the contributions, caused by a marginal change in
the tax rate, is equal to the corresponding change in the lobby group’s welfare.
Hence, the property corresponds to the marginal willingness to pay for a change
in the tax rate. The contribution schedules are said to be locally truthful around
the equilibrium pollution tax rate.15 Throughout the paper, this equilibrium
property is assumed to hold, meaning that equation (14) will be interpreted as
a constraint in the optimization process.
4 The Environmental Policy Outcome
The main purpose of this section is to derive optimal pollution taxes and to
study how exogenous changes in the number of lobby group members, as well
as changes in the relative weight the government attaches to social welfare, aﬀect
the policy outcome. To simplify the analysis, the section begins with a bench-
mark case in which the policy is determined without any inﬂuence of lobbying.
It then continues by incorporating lobbying into a symmetric framework where
the countries are identical in all important respects, and changes are symmetric
between the countries. Finally, the pollution taxes are derived and analyzed
with diﬀerences between the two countries, meaning that the assumption of
identical countries is relaxed.
Within the lobby group framework, a standard result when all individu-
als have their interests represented by lobby groups is that the policy outcome
becomes socially eﬃcient and replicates the ﬁrst best. This result is a direct
implication of an eﬃcient equilibrium as presented in Bernheim and Winston
(1986). The intuition is simply that the externality becomes completely inter-
nalized in this case. However given the speciﬁc setup of this paper, the exter-
nality is not completely internalized - even though all individuals have their
interests represented by lobby groups (this is explained in more detail below).
Accordingly, to simplify the analysis as much as possible, most of the results
15See e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1994) for a more rigorous discussion about this property.10 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
are presented with the assumption that all citizens are lobby group members
(i.e. either environmentalists or industrialists).
4.1 The benchmark case
In the absence of lobbying, the objective of each national government reduces
to the measure of aggregate social welfare. By using Wi = λ
iΩi,i ne q u a t i o n
(12), the optimal solution deﬁnes the pollution tax in country i as
ti = αE,i + αE,j (15)
where it is used that Ψi = Ψj in a symmetric equilibrium with identical coun-
tries16.
This result is standard and implies that the optimal pollution tax in each
country equals the sum of marginal social damage that this country generates.
Given the model speciﬁcation, the sum of marginal social damage is deﬁned as
the proportion of environmentalists in both countries.17
4.2 The symmetric equilibrium
The introduction of lobbying implies that each government maximizes the ob-
jective function deﬁned by equation (11). Consider the case where all citizens
are either environmentalists or industrialists, i.e. αE,i + αI,i =1 .
Proposition 1 Within the given framework, a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium with symmetric countries implies that the pollution taxes are deﬁned as





where αE,i = αE,j,λ
i = λ
j and i 6= j.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Compared with equation (15), the pollution tax in country i is lower than
in the benchmark case. The intuition is that a government only receives con-
tributions from domestic lobby groups and, therefore, attaches no weight to
16Without the assumption of identical countries, the pollution tax in country i equals




17This result corresponds to a tax rate equal to the sum of marginal willingness to pay to
avoid the pollution, i.e. ti =
S
i MWPi, in related literature. A Benthamite approach, where
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the other country’s environmentalists. The pollution tax reﬂects the weight
the other country’s government attaches to social welfare. The interpretation
must be that the marginal social damage from pollution in country j has less
impact on the pollution tax in country i. Accordingly, the introduction of lob-
bying implies that the pollution tax in country i is deﬁned as a weighted sum of
the marginal social damage in each country, and pollution taxes become lower
with lobbying than without (i.e., the benchmark case). This result implies that
although all citizens have their interests represented by lobby groups, the pol-
lution tax does not replicate ﬁrst best; the policy outcome does not completely
internalize the externality.
4.2.1 Comparative statics in a symmetric equilibrium
It is reasonable to assume that the environmental concern and industrial lobby-
ing may change within countries. It is also reasonable to assume that the weight
the government attaches to lobbying may change. It is, for example, possible
that a government’s motive may change over time, which is interpreted as a
change in the weight attached to contributions. Therefore, a relevant question
would be to ask how the equilibrium pollution taxes are aﬀected by changes in
αE,i and λ
i?
Given that all citizens are either environmentalist or industrialists, it is suf-
ﬁcient to study changes in only one lobby group’s member base, since the eﬀect
of the other lobby group becomes its mirror image. Moreover, to characterize
a general change in either the environmental concern, or in the weight the gov-
ernments attach to social welfare, in the two countries, it will be convenient to
deﬁne αE = αE,i + αE,j and λ = λ
i + λ
j . Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a symmetric equilibrium, a general increase in the environ-
mental concern or in the weight the governments attach to social welfare will
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To prove Proposition 2, diﬀerentiate the pollution tax equation derived in
Proposition 1 and solve for dti/dαE and dti/dλ, respectively.
First, consider the general increase in the environmental concern (deﬁned as
more environmentalists in both countries). In Proposition 1, the pollution tax
was deﬁned as a weighted sum of marginal social damages in countries i and
j. Hence, an increase in the number of environmentalists in both countries will
undoubtedly increase this weighted sum. The reason is that more individuals
in each country are negatively aﬀected by pollution, and thus accept/want a
higher tax on pollution.
To interpret the eﬀect on ti of increasing the weight attached to social wel-
f a r e ,n o t et h a taj o i n ti n c r e a s ei nλ
i and λ
j aﬀects the pollution tax in country
i via the preferences of country j’s environmentalists. When diﬀerentiating the
pollution tax in Proposition 1 with respect to both λ
i and λ
j, it becomes obvious
that an increase in λ
i tends to decrease the weight attached to the preferences
in country j, while an increase in λ
j tends to increase this weight. Hence, the
joint increase in λ
i and λ
j has both a positive and negative eﬀect on the tax
rate in country i. However, since the government in country i now attaches
relatively less weight on lobbying contributions compared to social welfare, the
net eﬀect becomes positive. The government in country i attaches relatively
more weight on the preferences of the environmentalists in country j.N o t i c e
that, as contributions become less important to the government, the pollution
tax approaches the benchmark case. In the limit, when λ
i goes to inﬁnity,
the contributions becomes insigniﬁcant and aggregate social welfare is all that
matters to the government.
4.3 Extensions
Although the assumption of symmetric countries gives intuitive results, it is
partly motivated by analytical convenience. Allowing for asymmetries between
the countries takes the analysis one step further. For example, the introduction
of asymmetries makes it possible to analyze pollution taxes when countries dif-
fer with respect to their environmental concern (number of environmentalists),
which certainly is a realistic scenario. As for the symmetric equilibrium, con-
sider the case where all citizens are lobby group members, i.e. αE,i + αI,i =1 .
Proposition 3 Within the given framework, a subgame perfect Nash equilib-Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 13
rium with asymmetric countries implies pollution taxes deﬁned by







Proof. See the Appendix.
When the analysis is extended to allow for asymmetries, the tax rates change
slightly. Compared with the symmetric equilibrium, the second part of the
pollution tax equation is now multiplied by the quotient of rents (Ψi/Ψj). If
the two countries are not identical, these rents may diﬀer and the quotient
may, therefore, deviate from unity. For example, countries may diﬀer with
respect to the proportion of environmentalists and/or industrialists as well as
the weight that the government attaches to social welfare. Assume for a moment
an exogenous change that only aﬀects country i and increases the rent Ψi.I n
such a case (cet. par.), the quotient of rents becomes larger than one and
thus works in the direction of increasing the pollution tax in country i.T h e
interpretation is that country i becomes more eager to reach an agreement (has
more to lose from a no-contract outcome or, alternatively, puts less pressure on
country j) and, therefore, accepts a higher tax on pollution.
To conclude, the introduction of asymmetries between the two countries may
either increase or decrease the pollution taxes, compared to the symmetric case,
depending on the relative rents.
4.3.1 Symmetric changes in an asymmetric equilibrium
From Proposition 3 it is obvious that, to analyze changes in the number of en-
vironmentalists and the weight attached to social welfare, eﬀects via the rents,
Ψi, need to be considered. This, however, implies a slightly more complicated
analysis since changes in exogenous variables in one country aﬀect the other
country’s policy decision via the quotient of rents. Recall that, the assump-
tion of symmetric countries actually implies that symmetric changes in both
countries have equal eﬀects on the rents - the rent eﬀects become insigniﬁcant.
Accordingly, the comparative statics in an asymmetric equilibrium must be
solved as a simultaneous system of equations (tax equations), where exogenous
changes may also aﬀect the fall-back outcome.
Given an asymmetric equilibrium, the total eﬀect on the pollution taxes
from an increase in the fraction of environmentalists in both countries becomes14 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
ambiguous. To see this, take as a starting point the pollution taxes deﬁned in
Proposition 3. By inspection, there are now eﬀects via the quotient of rents,
in addition to the positive eﬀects derived in Proposition 2. These rent eﬀects
capture how a change in the number of environmentalists aﬀects a country’s
incentives in the bargaining process (as described above). The total eﬀect be-
comes ambiguous since the rents in each country, Ψi and Ψj,a r ea ﬀected so
that they tend to increase, as well as decrease, the pollution tax. For instance,
one of the rent eﬀects (via Ψj) captures how an increase in the number of en-
vironmentalists in country j tends to decrease the pollution tax in country i
since the rent Ψj increases. The interpretation of this particular eﬀect is that
country j becomes more eager to reach an agreement when αE,j increases, and
relaxes the pressure on country i in the bargaining process.
To conclude, given symmetric countries a general increase in the environ-
mental concern increases the pollution tax. However, when allowing for asym-
metries, the possibility that a general increase in environmental concern actually
reduces the pollution tax cannot be excluded.
4.3.2 Asymmetric changes in a symmetric equilibrium
To develop the analysis further, it would be interesting to study the eﬀects on
the pollution taxes when the number of environmentalists changes in only one
country. Therefore, consider the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Starting with identical countries, an increase in the number of
environmentalists in country i (αE,i) increases the pollution tax in that country
(ti), while it has an ambiguous eﬀect on the other country’s pollution tax (tj).
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the environmental concern increases in one country, it is natural that
it aﬀects the domestic pollution tax, but, through the bargaining, it must also
be taken into account that it aﬀects the pollution tax in the other country. Be-
sides the positive eﬀects derived in the case with symmetric changes, there is
now an eﬀect via the rent in country i.S i n c e∂Ψi/∂αE,i > 0, this accentuates
the positive impact on the tax rate. The intuition follows the previously dis-
cussed rent eﬀects, which implies that country i becomes more eager to reach
an agreement and hence increases its pollution tax.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 15
The total ’cross-country’ eﬀect from an increase in αE,i is indeterminate
because, in addition to the eﬀects that tend to increase tj (corresponding to the
eﬀects in Proposition 2), there is a negative eﬀect that tends to decrease the
pollution tax tj. The intuition behind this negative eﬀe c ti st h a tt h ei n c r e a s e
in αE,i, and the corresponding reduction of pressure that country i puts on
country j in the bargaining process, implies that country j tends to reduce
its pollution tax. The government in country i becomes more eager to reach
an agreement when the number of environmentalists increases, and therefore
reduces its pressure on the other country. Therefore, if this eﬀect is large enough
an increase in the environmental concern in country i may actually reduce the
pollution tax in country j.
The exogenous change in the fraction of environmentalists aﬀects the welfare
in both the bargaining outcome and the fall-back outcome. This implies that
the assumption of the fall-back welfare is crucial for Proposition 4. So far in the
paper, it has been assumed that the fall-back welfare may be aﬀected by exoge-
nous changes in country characteristics. However, let us change the setup for a
m o m e n ta n dm a k ea na s s u m p t i o no faﬁxed fall-back welfare. This could, for
example, be the case if a supranational organization decides the environmental
policy if no contract is signed. In such a case, ∂Ψi/∂αE,i becomes negative and
turns the rent eﬀects discussed in Proposition 4 in the opposite direction. The
intuition is that, since more individuals are negatively aﬀected by pollution, the
increased number of environmentalists decreases the aggregate social welfare
cet.par. which decreases the rent. Recall the case of a ’ﬂexible’ fall-back wel-
fare in which more environmentalists reduced the aggregate social welfare to a
larger extent in the fall-back case, implying a positive eﬀect on the rent. Hence,
an increase in one country’s environmental concern has a corresponding impact
on the tax rates as in the ﬂexible ’fall-back’ case, yet with completely opposite
’rent eﬀects’. These opposite rent eﬀects imply that the ’cross country’ eﬀect
is now unambiguously positive, while the ’home country’ eﬀect is ambiguous.
The intuition behind these results is analogous to Proposition 4.
4.4 Pollution taxes with workers included
Although the assumption of αE,i + αI,i =1implies pollution taxes that dif-
fer from the ﬁrst best, it is reasonable to assume that some citizens are not




< 1 (as deﬁned in section 2.1).18 However,























is the tax elasticity of total pollution in country
i. By inspection, it can be found that β
i > 0 if total pollution is decreasing
in the tax rate, i.e. if δ
i < 0,a n di fαE,i + αI,i < 1.T h i s s h o w s t h a t , g i v e n
an asymmetric equilibrium where lobby groups employ campaign contributions
that fulﬁl the criterion for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and if pollution
taxes are determined in a Nash bargain between two countries, the outcome will
be tax rates deﬁned as
ti =
"










Therefore, the pollution tax in country i depends on lobby group member-
ship, the governments’ weights attached to aggregate social welfare and the tax
elasticity of pollution in country i. Moreover, the pollution taxes are unam-
biguously positive in equilibrium, given that total pollution is decreasing in the
tax rate, i.e. the tax elasticity of pollution is negative. When compared to the
pollution tax derived in Proposition 3, it becomes obvious that the previously
derived tax formula now is multiplied by β
i. Hence, an increase in β
i tends to
increase the tax rates and vice versa. This means that the pollution tax now
depends on the tax elasticity of pollution, δ
i.D i ﬀerentiation of equation (16)
gives that β
i is decreasing in δ
i, which implies that the tax rate tends to in-
crease (via β
i) the more sensitive pollution is to changes in the tax rate (δ
i more
negative). The intuition behind this result is that, although the positive welfare
eﬀect to environmentalists increases, the negative tax revenue eﬀect through
the lost tax base dominates and hence tends to decrease the tax rate.
Finally, it is worth noting that the only diﬀerence compared with the tax
rates derived in Proposition 3 is that not all citizens are lobby group members.
Accordingly, when the number of lobby group members increases, the pollution
tax approaches that in Proposition 3. If all citizens are lobby group members,
Proposition 3 becomes completely replicated (β
i =1 ).
18This result is referred to as the ‘general case’ in the Appendix.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 17
5 Summary and Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to derive pollution taxes in the context of
lobbying and transboundary pollution. In the speciﬁc setup, pollution in one
country is assumed to aﬀect not only residents in that country but also residents
in another country. A standard lobby group model is used to characterize the
inﬂuence from environmental and industrial lobbying on an incumbent govern-
ment. The framework is then extended to incorporate environmental policies
determined in a negotiation between the two countries aﬀected by pollution.
It is found that the assumption of local lobbying, implying that the domestic
government puts no weight on the preferences of the other country’s environ-
mentalists, tends to reduce the pollution tax. The intuition is that a government
has no incentive to satisfy the preferences of lobby group members in the other
country. Note, however, that it will still be a bargaining outcome where each
country considers the other country. Second, a general increase in the envi-
ronmental concern and in the weight the governments attach to social welfare,
respectively, tends to increase the pollution tax in a symmetric equilibrium.
The intuition for the ﬁrst part is that more people experience disutility from
pollution, which increases the willingness to pay for reduced pollution levels and
hence increases the tax on pollution. The second part is explained by the fact
that when a government increases the relative weight attached to social welfare,
it increases the weight attached to environmentalists’ preferences in the other
country.
The model also shows that an increase in the number of environmentalists in
just one country may reduce the other country’s tax on pollution in a symmetric
equilibrium. The intuition behind this result is that a government tends to
accept a higher tax on pollution when the number of environmentalists in that
country increases, which implies that the other country tends to reduce its tax
on pollution.
Allowing for asymmetries between the two countries gives rise to interesting
consequences. For example, it is possible that a general increase in the environ-
mental concern reduces the taxes on pollution. The driving force behind this
result follows the same intuition as in the symmetric equilibrium when the num-
ber of environmentalists in just one country increases. That is, a government
becomes more eager to reach an agreement when the number of environmen-18 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
talists increases in that country, which leads to reduced pressure on the other
country to implement a high tax on pollution.
The main implication of this paper is that it is not always correct that an
increase in the environmental concern increases the pollution taxes. This is an
interesting ﬁnding since it seems to correspond to results in Conconi (2003).
However, it is important to emphasize that the result in the present paper
arises strictly from the bargaining process and does not rest on the assumption
of trade between the two countries, i.e. it is not a terms of trade eﬀect as in
Conconi (2003). Hence, the point to be made here is that, although due to
completely diﬀerent mechanisms than other studies, the present model gives
rise to the counterintuitive possibility that an increase in the environmental
concern increases the pollution taxes.
A possible extension of the present paper would be to change the setup
slightly and allow for transboundary pollution in a more ‘unrestricted’ way.
This is possible in our speciﬁc framework, although it would require a consid-
erably more complicated analysis of the comparative statics. Another possible
extension is to moderate the bargaining process in a more sophisticated manner
(e.g. by endogenous participation). In addition, it would also be possible to
extend the model to include ‘cross-national’ lobbying as discussed in the intro-
duction. However as indicated, these extensions are left for future research.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 19
A Appendix
In the Appendix, subindices denote partial derivatives, e.g. Ψi
αE,i = ∂Ψi/∂αE,i




The general case The ‘general case’ refers to the model deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n s
2 and 3, i.e. the complete model without any simplifying assumptions. Section
4.4 follows from, and discusses, this ’general case’.



















is the tax elasticity of total pollution in country
i. By substituting for Ψi
ti and Ψ
j
ti into the ﬁrst order condition for an optimal













P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 The assumptions of symmetry and αE,i + αI,i =1





, respectively. By substituting this
into equation (A.2), the following is obtained











. By substituting this into equation (A.2), the following is
obtained







A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
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The determinant of the ﬁrst matrix on the left can be written as |H| =
zi ¡
2Γtitj + zi¢





pΨj.I tc a nb es h o w nt h a t ,b yu s i n g
the ﬁrst order condition for the maximization of the Nash product (see equation
(13)), Γtitj = Γtjti > 0. Moreover, the second order conditions for a maximum
imply that Γtiti,Γtjtj < 0.







Since |H| > 0, the numerator determines the sign of dti/dαE,i. Starting with












Γtitj > 0 (A.7)
implying that dti/d α E,i > 0.







Since |H| > 0, the numerator determines the sign of dti/dαE,i. Starting with















Γtitj R 0 (A.9)
implying that dti/d α E,i R 0.Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary... 21
References
[1] Aidt, T.S. (1998) Political internationalization of economic externalities
and environmental policy. Journal of Public Economics 69 1-16.
[2] Aidt, T.S. (2005) The rise of environmentalism, pollution taxes and intra-
industry trade. Economics of Governance 6 1-12.
[3] Aidt, T.S. and Hwang, U. (2008) On the internalization of cross national ex-
ternalities through political markets. The case of labour standards. Forth-
coming in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
[4] Barrett, S. (1994) Self-enforcing international environmental agreements.
Oxford Economic Papers 46 878-894.
[5] Bernheim, B.D. and Whinston, M.D. (1986) Menu auctions, resource allo-
cation, and economic inﬂuence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 1-31.
[6] Buchner, B. and Carraro, C. (2005) Regional and sub-global climate blocs.
A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes. Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Papers: 2005.21.
[7] Carraro, C. (ed.) (2003) The endogenous formation of economic coalitions.
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
[8] Conconi, P. (2003) Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large
open economies. Journal of International Economics 59 399-422.
[9] Dixit, A. (1996) Special-interest lobbying and endogenous commodity tax-
ation. Eastern Economic Journal vol. 22, No. 4 375-388.
[10] Fredriksson, P.G. (1997) The political economy of pollution taxes in a small
open economy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33
44-58.
[11] Fredriksson, P.G. and Millimet, D.L. (2007) Legislative organization and
pollution taxation. Public Choice 131 217-242.
[12] Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1994) Protection for sale. American
Economic Review 84 833-850.22 Environmental Policy Negotiations, Transboundary...
[13] Grossman, G.M. and Helpman, E. (1995) Trade wars and trade talks. Jour-
nal of Political Economy vol. 103, No. 4 675-708.
[14] Mäler, K.-G. (1989) The acid rain game. in: Folmer, H. and van Ierland, E.
(eds.) Valuation methods and policy making in environmental economics.
Elsevier, Amsterdam, 231-252.
[15] Olson, M. (1965) The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
[16] Prat, A. and Rustichini, A. (2003) Games played through agents. Econo-
metrica 71(4) 989-1026.